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Abstract—We consider in this paper dynamic Multiple Access
(MAC) games between a random number of players competing
over collision channels. Each of several mobiles involved in an
interaction determines whether to transmit at a high or at a
low power. High power decreases the lifetime of the battery but
results in smaller collision probability. We formulate this game as
an anonymous sequential game with undiscounted reward which
we recently introduced and which combines features from both
population games (infinitely many players) and stochastic games.
We briefly present this class of games and basic equilibrium
existence results for the total expected reward as well as for the
expected average reward. We then apply the theory in the MAC
game.
Keywords: Stochastic game, Population game, Anonymous
sequential game, Average reward, Total reward, Stationary
policy
I. INTRODUCTION
A well known class of games that involves a continuum
of atomless players are evolutionary games, in which pairs of
players that play a matrix game are selected at random, see
[1]. This game allows to predict the fraction of the population
(or of populations in the case of several classes) that play each
possible action at equilibrium. This modelling paradigm along
with the solution concept called Evolutionary Stable Strategy
has had quite a success in biology (we refer the reader to [2],
[3]). The player’s type in these games is fixed, and the actions
of the players determine directly their utilities.
An extension of this model is needed to model the possi-
bility that the player’s class may change randomly in time,
and to allow the utility of a player to depend not only on the
current actions of players but also on future interactions. The
class of the player is called its individual or private state. The
choice of an action by a player should then take into account
not only the game played at the present individual state but
the future state evolution. We are interested in particular in the
case where the action of a player not only impacts the current
utility but also the transition probabilities to the next state.
We use the framework of anonymous sequential games,
introduced by B. Jovanovic and R.W. Rosenthal in 1988 in
[4]. In that work, each player’s utility is given as the expected
discounted utility over an infinite horizon. The theory of
anonymous sequential games with discounted utilities was
further developped in [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. We build in this
paper on a recent theoretical work [13], [15] that establishes
the theory of anonymous sequential games for both the cases
of total expected cost criterion as well as the time average
expected cost. Other applications to power control, to road
traffic and to maintenance have been reported in [14] and in
[13], [15]. Similar extensions have been proposed and studied
for the framework of evolutionary games in [10], [11]. The
analysis there turns out to be simpler since the utility in each
encounter between two players turns out to be bilinear there.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with a
section with an overview of the model. The following section
presents the theory for the average and the total reward. We
then apply this framework to the dynamic MAC game and
derive the equilibrium policy.
II. ANONYMOUS SEQUENTIAL GAMES
The presentation below is based on [13]. The anonymous
sequential game is described by the following objects:
• We assume that the game is played in discrete time, that
is t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
• The game is played by an infinite number (continuum)
of players. Each player has his own private state s ∈ S,
changing over time. We assume that S is a finite set.
• The global state, µt, of the system at time t, is a
probability distribution over S. It describes the proportion
of the population, which is at time t in each of the
individual states. We assume that each player has an
ability to observe the global state of the game, so from
his point of view the state of the game at time t is1
(st, µ
t) ∈ S ×∆(S).
• The set of actions available to a player in state (s, µ) is a
nonempty set A(s, µ), with A :=
⋃
(s,µ)∈S×∆(S) A(s, µ)
1Here and in the sequel for any set B, ∆(B) denotes the set of all the
finite-support probability measures on B. In particular, if B is a finite set,
it denotes the set of all the probability measures over B. In such a case we
always assume that ∆(B) is endowed with Euclidean topology.
– a finite set. We assume that the mapping A is an upper
semicontinuous function.
• Global distribution of the state-action pairs at any time t
is given by the measure τ t ∈ ∆(S×A). The global state
of the system µt is the marginal of τ t on S.
• An individual’s immediate reward at any stage t, when
his private state is st, he plays action at and the global
state-action measure is τ t is u(st, at, τ
t). It is a (jointly)
continuous function.
• The transitions are defined for each individual separately
with the transition function Q : S × A × ∆(S × A) →
∆(S) which is also a (jointly) continuous function. We
will write Q(·|st, at, τ
t) for the distribution of the indi-
vidual state at time t + 1, given his state at time t, st,
his action at and the state-action distribution of all the
players.




a∈A Q(·|s, a, τ
t)τ tsa.
Any function f : S × ∆(S) → ∆(A) satisfying
suppf(s, µ) ⊂ A(s, µ) for every s ∈ S and µ ∈ ∆(S) is called
a stationary policy. We denote the set of stationary policies in
our game by U .
A. Average reward
We define the long-time average reward of a player using
stationary policy f when all the other players use policy g
and the initial state distribution (both of the player and his
opponents) is µ1, to be











Further, we define a stationary strategy f and a measure µ ∈
∆(S) to be an equilibrium in the long-time average reward
game if for every other stationary strategy g ∈ U ,
J(µ, f, f) ≥ J(µ, g, f)
and, if µ1 = µ and all the players use policy f then µt = µ
for every t ≥ 1.
B. Total reward
To define the total reward in our game let us distinguish
one state in S, say s0 and assume that A(s0, µ) = {a0}
independently of µ for some fixed a0. Then the total reward
of a player using stationary policy f when all the other players
apply policy g and the initial distribution of the states of
his opponents is µ1, while his own is ρ1, is defined in the
following way:







where T is the moment of the first arrival of the process st
to s0. We interpret it as the reward accumulated by the player
over whole of his lifetime. State s0 is an artificial state (so is
2Note that its transition is deterministic.
action a0) denoting that a player is dead. µ
1 is the distribution
of the states across the population when he is born, while ρ1 is
the distribution of initial states of new-born players. The fact
that after some time the state of a player can become again
different from s0 should be interpreted as that after some time
the player is replaced by some new-born one.
The notion of equilibrium for the total reward case will
be slightly different from that for the average reward. We
define a stationary strategy f and a measure µ ∈ ∆(S) to
be in equilibrium in the total reward game if for every other
stationary strategy g ∈ U ,
J(ρ, µ, f, f) ≥ J(ρ, µ, g, f),
where ρ = Q(·|s0, a0, τ(f, µ)) and (τ(f, µ))sa = µs(f(s))a
for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and, if µ1 = µ and all the players use
policy f then µt = µ for every t ≥ 1.
III. EXISTENCE OF THE STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
Average-reward Case
We next introduce an important assumption on the individ-
ual state process.
(A1) The set of individual states of any player S can be parti-
tioned into two sets S0 and S1 such that for every state-
action distribution of all the other players τ ∈ ∆(S×A):
(a) All the states from S0 are transient in the Markov
chain of individual states of a player using any f ∈
U .
(b) The set S1 is strongly communicating.
In [13], [15], a couple of equivalent definitions of “strongly
communicating” are cited. It is shown in [15] through an
example that without assumption (A1) the average-reward
anonymous sequential game may have no stationary equilibria
at all.
Theorem 1: Every anonymous sequential game with long-
time average payoff satisfying (A1) has a stationary equilib-
rium.
The Total-reward Case
We will assume the following:
(T1) There exists a p0 > 0 such that for any fixed state-
action measure τ and under any stationary policy f the
probability of getting from any state s ∈ S \ {s0} to s0
in |S| − 1 steps is not smaller than p0.
Remark 1: The total reward model, specifically when (T1)
is assumed, bears a lot of resemblance to an exponentially
discounted model where the discount factor is allowed to
fluctuate over time, which suggests that the results in the two
models should not differ much. Note however that there is one
essential difference between these two models. The ‘discount
factor’ in the total reward model (which is the ratio of those
who stay alive after a given period to those who were alive
at its beginning) appears not only in the cumulative reward of
the players but also in the stationary state of the game, and
thus also in the per-period rewards of the players. Thus this is
an essentially different (and slightly more complex) problem.
On the other hand, the fact that each of the players lives for
a finite period and then is replaced by another player, with a
fixed fraction of players dead and fixed fractions of players
in each of the states when the game is in a stationary state,
makes this model similiar to the average reward one. In fact,
using the renewal theorem, we can relate the rewards of the
players in the total reward model with those in the respective
average reward model. This relation in used a couple of times
in our proofs.
Theorem 2: Every anonymous sequential game with total
reward satisfying (T1) has a stationary equilibrium.
IV. APPLICATION: MEDIUM ACCESS GAME
A. The Model
Consider the following MAC (Medium ACcess) game be-
tween mobile phones. Time is slotted. At any given time t, a
mobile finds itself competing with Nt other mobiles for the
access to a channel. Nt is assumed to have Poisson distribution
with parameter λ. We shall formulate this as a sequential
anonymous game as follows.
• Individual state A mobile has three possible states: F
(full) AE (Almost Empty) and E (Empty).
• Actions There are two actions: transmit at high power H
or low power L. At state AE a mobile cannot transmit
at high power, while at E it cannot transmit at all.
• Transition probabilities From state AE the mobile
moves to state E with probability pE and otherwise
remains in AE. At state E the mobile has to recharge. It
moves to state F after one time unit. A mobile in state
F transmitting with power r moves to state AE with
probability proportional to r and given by αr for some
constant α > 0.
• Payoff Consider a given cellular phone that transmits
a packet. Assume that x other packets are transmitted
with high power and y with low power to the same base
station. A packet transmitted with low power is received
successfully with some probability q if it is the only
packet transmitted, i.e. y = 0, x = 0. Otherwise it is
lost. A packet transmitted with high power is received
successfully with some probability Q > q if it is the
only packet transmitted at high power, i.e. x = 0.
The immediate payoff is 1 if the packet is successfully
transmitted. It is otherwise zero. In addition there is a
constant cost c > 0 for recharging the battery. Aggregate
utility for a player is then computed as long-time average
of the per-period payoffs.
Suppose p is the fraction of population that transmits at high
power in state F , and that µF , µAE and µE are fractions of
players in respective states. Then probability of success for a
player transmitting at high power is








= Qe−λeλ(1−pµF ) = Qe−λpµF , (1)
while the probability of success when a player transmits at
low power is







= qe−λeλµE = qeλ(µE−1). (2)
These values do not depend on actual numbers of players
applying respective strategies – only on fractions of players
in each of the states using different actions. Thus instead
of considering an n-player game for any fixed n it is
reasonable to apply the anonymous game formulation with
τ = [τF,H , τF,L, τAE,L, τE ] denoting the vector of fractions
of players in respective states and using respective actions,
with immediate rewards




Qe−λτF,H , when a = H
qeλ(τE−1), when a = L
−c, when s = E




1− αa αa 0





The stationary state of the chain of the private states of a
player using policy f prescribing him to use high power with
probability p when in state F is
1
α(pH + (1− p)L)(pE + 1) + pE
× [pE , α(pH + (1− p)L), pEα(pH + (1− p)L)] .
Thus computations yield that his respected long-run average





−λτF,H + ((H − L)α− pE)qe
λ(τE−1)
−cαpE(H − L),
B = (Lα+ pE)qe
λ(τE−1) − cαpEL,
C = α(H − L)(pE + 1),
D = αL(pe + 1) + pE .
It can be either a strictly increasing, a constant or a strictly
decreasing function of p, depending on whether AD > BC,
AD = BC or AD < BC, and thus the best response of a
player against the aggregated state-action vector τ is p = 1
when AD > BC, any p ∈ [0, 1] when AD = BC or p = 0
when AD < BC. This leads to the following conclusion:
since by Theorem 1 this anonymous game has an equilibrium,







+((H − L)α− pE)qe
−
λ(αH+pE)























+((H − L)α− pE)qe
−
λ(αL+pE)















then all the players use low power in state F at equilib-
rium.

























α(p∗H + (1− p∗)L)pE
α(p∗H + (1− p∗)L)(pE + 1) + pE
. (4)
Then all the players use policy prescribing to use high
power with probability p∗ in state F at equilibrium.
Remark 2: It is worth noting here that some generalizations
of the model presented above can be considered. We can
assume that there are more energy levels and more powers at
which players could transmit in our game (similarly as in [14]).
We can also assume that the players do not always transmit,
only with some positive probability (then the individual state
becomes two-dimensional, consisting of player’s energy state
and an indicator of whether he has something to transmit
or not). Both these generalizations are tractable within our
framework, though the computations become more involved.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The anonymous sequential games that we used here have
various common elements with the classical traffic assignment
problem [12]. Both problems deal with an infinity of players
so as to model large populations. In both frameworks, players
can be in different individual states. In the traffic assignment
problem, a class can be characterized by a source-destination
pair, or by a vehicle type (car, pedestrian or bicycle). In
contrast, the class of a player in anonymous sequential games
can change in time. Transition probabilities that govern this
change may depend not only on the individual’s state, but
also on the fraction of players that are in each individual state
and that use different actions. Furthermore, these transitions
are controlled by the player. A strategy of a player of a given
class in the traffic assignment problem can be identified as the
probability it would choose a given action (path) among those
available to its class. The definition of a strategy in our case is
similar, except that now the probability for choosing different
actions should be specified for each possible individual state.
The class of anonymous sequential games is a powerful tool
for modeling competition between populations. In this paper
we illustrated its usefulness in network engineering. There are
however many theoretical open questions that require further
reseach on this class of games such as existence of Evolution-
ary Stable Strategy (which is a standard equilibrium notion in
population games) and the definition and the convergence of
replicator dynamics in that setting.
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